Search results for "Self model"
showing 3 items of 3 documents
Phenomenal transparency and cognitive self-reference
2003
A representationalist analysis of strong first-person phenomena is developed (Baker 1998), and it is argued that conscious, cognitive self-reference can be naturalized under this representationalist analysis. According to this view, the phenomenal first-person perspective is a condition of possibility for the emergence of a cognitive first-person perspective. Cognitive self-reference always is reference to the phenomenal content of a transparent self-model. The concepts of phenomenal transparency and introspection are clarified. More generally, I suggest that the concepts of “phenomenal opacity” and “phenomenal transparency” are interesting instruments for analyzing conscious, self-represen…
Empirical perspectives from the self-model theory of subjectivity: a brief summary with examples
2007
Abstract A concise sketch of the self-model theory of subjectivity (SMT; Metzinger, 2003a), aimed at empirical researchers. Discussion of some candidate mechanisms by which self-awareness could appear in a physically realized information-processing system like the brain, using empirical examples from various scientific disciplines. The paper introduces two core-concepts, the “phenomenal self-model” (PSM) and the “phenomenal model of the intentionality relation” (PMIR), developing a representationalist analysis of the conscious self and the emergence of a first-person perspective.
The myth of cognitive agency: subpersonal thinking as a cyclically recurring loss of mental autonomy
2018
This metatheoretical paper investigates mind wandering from the perspective of philosophy of mind. It has two central claims. The first is that, on a conceptual level, mind wandering can be fruitfully described as a specific form of mental autonomy loss. The second is that, given empirical constraints, most of what we call “conscious thought” is better analyzed as a subpersonal process that more often than not lacks crucial properties traditionally taken to be the hallmark of personal-level cognition - such as mental agency, explicit, consciously experienced goal-directedness, or availability for veto control. I claim that for roughly two thirds of our conscious life-time we do not possess …